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| [ PHOTO: USA TODAY ] |
October 23, 2018
Peter Solari, Editor in Chief Follow @4PeteSakeNY
The New York Giants fell to 1-6 on the season Monday night after losing to the Falcons 23-20 in Atlanta, and all the postgame talk focused on head coach Pat Shurmur's decision to go for two late in the fourth quarter, after a 2-yard touchdown run closed the Giants' deficit to eight points, 20-12.
Amidst all the ballyhoo, it's important to remember that this play ultimately had no impact on the outcome of the game. You can argue from a "momentum" standpoint if you'd like, but I'm not buying it. However, for the sake of this piece, let's forget all of that. Let's forget that if the Giants' $95 million receiver had caught the ball on the controversial two-point conversion attempt, then this play would've been forgotten. Let's forget that the Giants' defense failed to prevent the Falcons from scoring on the ensuing possession. Let's forget that some kicker from Italy that you never heard of before Monday, all but ended the game when he booted a 56-yard field goal to give the Falcons an 11-point lead with less than two minutes to play. And let's forget that the Giants' hapless offense threw even the possibility of a miraculous comeback out the window, when they wasted 40 valuable seconds trying to punch the ball in from Atlanta's 1-yard line. Yes, let's forget all of that, because according the analytics, Shurmur's decision to go for two in that situation was the correct call, and that's what's really at issue here.
As Seth Walder from ESPN Analytics explains:
We've all seen coaches consulting those charts on the sidelines, the ones that tell them whether to they should go for two, or just kick the extra point, in various situations. Well, as it turns out, Shurmur not only examined his chart, but acted on its advice as well.The math backs up Pat Shurmur's decision to go for two down eight points with less than five minutes to go. Going for it then gives Shurmur an informational advantage. If the Giants convert, then on their next touchdown they know they only need to kick a PAT to take the lead (assuming no other scores). If they fail, which they did, they have an opportunity to go for it again to tie. The long and short of it: converting once is much more likely than failing twice.
I'm sure Dave Gettleman is going to be furious at Pat Shurmur for using analytics. pic.twitter.com/X5WPpplBQl— RegularSZN Ethan (@EthanGSN) October 23, 2018
According to the chart, had the Giants converted on the two-point attempt, their win probability would have increased 5.2%, whereas kicking the extra point would have only garnered a 3.3% increase in win probability. So naturally, Shurmur made the correct call, right? Wrong!
There are multiple problems with using this chart as an end-all-be-all when determining whether or not to go for two. First and foremost, being that the chart just assumes you will convert on your extra point(s) attempts. In other words, when you're down by eight points, your win probability will only increase by 5%, if your two-point conversion attempt is actually successful, as several Twitter users aptly pointed out:
This. What is the net change if you fail to get 2? My guess is that it’s greater than 5.2%— Tim McCarthy (@timmccrthy) October 23, 2018
What the infamous chart won't tell you is that NFL teams have a nearly 50% greater chance of kicking an extra point than they do of successfully converting a two-point attempt. As Five Thirty Eight pointed out back in 2016, NFL teams had converted on 47.1% of two-point conversion attempts since 2001. Meanwhile, since moving extra point kicks back to the 15-yard line in 2015, teams had a 94.4% success rate. So if you're Coach Shurmur on Monday night, you have to ask yourself if tthose odds and that risk are worth a meager 2% jump in win probability. They aren't.
What's further problematic about the chart, is that it considers one factor, and one factor only: that you're down by eight points. It doesn't care if you're 1-5 and desperate for a win, or if your offense is famous for its inability to find the end zone, all of which Shurmur should have considered.
While it may be true (for the average NFL team), as Walden says, that "converting once is much more likely than failing twice," the Giants aren't an average NFL team right now. They're a bad one. And as someone who has, and does watch this team on a consistent basis, I have no problem envisioning them failing on a couple of two-point conversion attempts.
"Better safe than sorry" would have been the appropriate call for Shurmur on Monday night. There may be some who rightfully have no faith in the Giants winning an overtime game, and might appreciate Shurmur's aggressive nature. That's certainly understandable, but big picture-wise, a tie, or even an OT-loss, would have at least been a step in the right direction. Instead, we're left scratching our heads after another bad loss, and no visible light at the end of the tunnel.
But it's important to remember that none of this affected the outcome of Monday's game. At the end of the day, the same laundry list of problems did the Giants in; their failure to wake up before it was too late, not withstanding.
